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Putin's Federal Reforms -
A Legal-Institutional Perspective 
Happy families are all alike; 
every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way. 
Leo Tolstoy, Anna Karenina 
No one argues that Russian executive power 
must be enforced, but what does that have to do 
with the rights of the regions? It is impossible 
to form a strong family by force; one can do so only 
with consent and mutual affection. 
Farit Mukhametshin, Chairman, 
Tatar State Council, 3 August 20001 
On the eve of the new millennium, Tolstoy's description of the state of affairs 
at Oblonsky's house seemed an accurate pronouncement on Boris Yeltsin's 
federal relationships: everything was in confusion.2 Federal authority was as 
Often openly flaunted as resentfully acknowledged. The eighty-nine presidential 
envoys that Yeltsin dispatched to the regions in 1997 to enforce federal law 
easily corrupted by the regional authorities on whom they and their 
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families depended for housing, education and even their own offices. By 1999 
they had been all but forgotten by the federal centre. Yeltsin's regional poli~ • 
had regressed from one of hesitant negotiation with a few regional powers to .. 
incessant deal-making. With each new bilateral deal, Moscow weakened its 
power to enforce its will, and muddied the constitutional authority to assert its 
rights. The Federation was held together by two unstable forces: personal 
agreements between elites (many of whom were in power since Soviet times), 
and the economic necessity born of desperate times. 
The inauguration of Vladimir Putin led almost immediately to substantial · 
changes for Russian federalism, though no one at the time predicted the reforms 
that would spring from the colourless chekist who replaced Sergei Stepashin as ·. 
Prime Minister in Fall 1999. Prior to Yeltsin's surprise New Year's Eve resignation, 
Putin's regional politics extended to the brutal war he had restarted in Chechnya. 
The first year of Putin's presidency, however, proved to be the most concerted 
and fundamental shake-up of federal relations in Russia since the 1993 Consti-
tution. 
This paper examines this transition in detail, focusing attention on the legal-
institutional aspects of this dramatic shift in policy. First, the end ofYeltsin's 
'parade' - of sovereignties, bilateral treaties and special agreements - is exa-
mined. Next, attention is paid to Putin's early decrees: 'positive' decrees creating 
the seven federal districts and federal envoys, and 'negative' decrees that annulled 
regional laws and legal acts judged by him not to be in conformity with federal 
law. Finally, I explore Putin's legislative reforms - a three-part package of bills 
that altered the composition of the upper chamber of the federal parliament, 
the Federation Council (hereafter FC), and the relationship of its former mem-
bers to the federal president. 
Requiem for the Bilateral Treaty Process 
Throughout the Yeltsin administration, bilateral treaties (dogovory) and agree-
ments (soglasheniia ), from negotiation to signature, were an exclusively executive 
branch activity. Federal and regional legislatures were neither required nor 
invited to participate at any stage of the process. Only the signature of presidents 
and prime ministers appeared at the bottom of these documents, without any 
process of legislative ratification. This omission was deliberate. Struggling to 
control both the federal parliament and the regions, Yeltsin's super-presidential 
powers could only weaken by adding more players to the negotiation game. 
For regional executives, many of whom held their parliaments under thumb, 
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ratification by another branch of government was either superfluous or an 
unnecessary risk. Past practice in Soviet patron-client relations, in which all of 
'the participants had received their political schooling, further encouraged the 
personalisation - rather than the institutionalisation - of federal-regional 
politics. 
Resort to the old patron-client politics, however, placed treaties and 
agreements in an ambiguous legal position. Certainly, these documents did 
not have the status of federal constitutional law, or even federal law, having 
completely circumvented the Federal Assembly. What standing such documents 
had in regional law was equally unclear given the absence of any legislative 
approval in regional parliaments. Nor could they be considered the equivalent 
of federal or regional presidential decrees (ukazy), as these acquire legal force 
through official publication, a requirement never established for bilateral 
arrangements. Indeed, throughout the 'Parade of Treaties; popular wisdom held 
that the most sensitive (and lucrative) deals were purposely kept hidden from 
scrutiny. 
The highly personalized manner in which treaties and agreements were 
concluded created political problems. All forty-seven treaties agreed between 
1994 and 1998 were signed by Boris Yeltsin. The vast majority of names on the 
other side of the page were those of regional elites who were still in office in 
1999. What would happen to these documents when one or both men (and 
they were all men) left office? Would they still be accorded the force of law? 
Too late, Yeltsin attempted to reform this system. On 30 July 1999, a new 
federal law came into force to regulate the bilateral treaty process.3 Prima facie, 
.this law seemed to institutionalise mechanisms for wider participation in the 
passage of federal laws dividing issues of joint competency between the 
Federation and the regions. The law re-emphasized the supremacy of federal 
laws and the RF Constitution in the hierarchy of laws (Art. 3, § l; Art. 4). The 
principle of glasnost in drafting and promulgating treaties was also categorically 
asserted (Art. 10). Regions were given three years to bring existing treaties and 
agreements into conformity with federal law (Art. 32, § 2). Of course, after 
Years spent disregarding similar passages in the Federation Treaty, Constitution 
and countless federal pronouncements, these old mantras had a hollow ring. 
There was no rush to reform. 
The empty repetition of fundamental principles belied a more serious lacuna 
in the law. A fundamental shortcoming of the new law was the absence of a 
stronger role for the Federal Assembly and regional legislatures in the treaty-
tnaking process. The 1999 law did not require the ratification of treaties by 
federal and regional legislatures, only examination (rassmotreniia) (Art. 23, §§ 
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2-4).4 Lacking any right of refusal, or even redaction, legislatures were _"''''-'Jlt"n 
at the negotiating table - best seen, but not heard.5 
Time showed the change to be a superficial one. Yeltsin never signed another 
treaty, and Putin, in the first year of his presidency, radically changed the rules 
of the federal game with his sweeping package of reforms - a future the 
benefactors of this personality-driven process had always feared. From June 
1998 through November 2001, no new bilateral treaties or agreements were 
signed and no existing ones renewed as deadlines passed.6 In a speech to the 
nation in May 2000, Putin declared, 'I am addressing the lawmakers once again. 
Once again I would like to stress that the period of forced compromises leading 
to instability is over.'7 Yeltsin' s law on the bilateral treaty process, like the treaties 
and agreements that were its target, was left to wither on the vine. 
'The Dictatorship of Law' 
Early in his presidential campaign, Vladimir Putin introduced a strange phrase 
into the political lexicon: 'the dictatorship oflaw: Putin's speeches and writings 
on democracy and law were at once encouraging and chilling. His use of 
democratic concepts often left unclear in what manner he thought them best 
applied: 
In a non-law-governed, i.e. weak, state the individual is defenceless and not free. The 
stronger the state, the freer the individual. In a democracy, your and my rights are 
limited only by the same rights enjoyed by other people. It is on recognising this simple 
truth that the law is based, the law that is to be followed by all - from an authority 
figure to a simple citizen.But democracy is the dictatorship of the law - not of those 
placed in an official position to defend that law .... I know there are many now that are 
afraid of order. But order is nothing more than rules. And let those who are currently 
engaged in substituting concepts for one another, trying to pass off the absence of 
order for genuine democracy- let them, I say, stop looking for hidden dirty tricks and 
trying to scare us with the past. 'Our land is rich, but there is no order in it~ they used 
to say in Russia. Nobody will ever say such things about us in future.8 
Such statements sent shockwaves through Russia's weak democratic opposi-
tion.9 Did the Russian president mean the 'Rule of Law; or a more frightening, 
bureaucratised rule through laws? Was Putin's oxymoronic linkage of dictator-
ship and law compatible with the tremendous act of self-restraint that is 
government under law?10 Transition away from authoritarianism, as well as the 
development of stable federal relations, hinged on that choice. 
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Vladimir Putin's reforms can be divided into three categories. The first reform, 
the establishment of federal districts and presidential envoys, reshaped the 
geographic space of federal politics. The second reform was in fact a reassertion 
of existing powers: Putin seized on presidential authority, left virtually unused 
by Yeltsin, to suspend the decrees of five regional executives and place Chechnya 
under direct presidential control. At the same time - some have suggested 
operating under political pressure - the Constitutional Court issued two 
sweeping rulings that re-stated its deeply pro-centralising philosophy of 
federalism and declared the constitutions of seven republics to be riddled with 
fundamental violations of the federal Constitution. Putin commenced a 
program, more stick than carrot, of establishing his executive 'power vertical' 
over the regions, demanding the 'harmonisation' of their laws and constitutions 
with federal law and the federal constitution. His disinterest in revisiting bilateral 
treaties was palpable. Third, Putin successfully reshaped the FC and strengthened 
his 'executive vertical' powers with a summer legislative package. 
Presidential Envoys and Federal districts 
The first salvo in Putin's federal reforms was fired less than a week after Putin 
swore his oath of office. On 13 May 2000, Putin signed a presidential decree on 
••. 'The Plenipotentiary Representative of the President in a Federal District:'11 
The decree and accompanying regulations (polozhenie) divided Russia into seven 
federal districts. These districts coincided with existing military districts. Yeltsin's 
eighty-nine presidential representatives - one for each subject of the Federation 
•·•••""·were replaced by the heads of these new districts; officially termed 
'plenipotentiaries' (polnomochnye predstaviteli, or polpredy for short), they were 
·~ore commonly called 'presidential envoys; or less favorably, 'namestniki; 
.,referring to the tsarist 'governors-general' established by Catherine the Great. 12 
.According to the decree, these polpredy were officially part of the Administration 
pf the President (the Main Control Directorate - GKU), and charged with 
?verseeing the President's constitutional authority in the districts. The 
Presidential decree and resolution were cryptically vague regarding specific 
d_uties, powers and limitations of this new office.13 
.·. District capitals were chosen to deflate the leadership pretensions of the most 
owerful regions. In the Volga district, which included such powerhouses as 
atarstan and Bashkortostan, the seat of power became Nizhnii Novgorod (not 
azau or Ufa, the respective capitals of these republics), the power base of its 
plenipotentiary, Sergei Kirienko. In no case was a district capital located in 
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a republic. While Moscow, St. Petersburg and Ekaterinburg seemed inevitable 
choices, Khabarovsk, Rostov on Don and Novosibirsk appeared to be chosen 
to reshape the balance of power. 
The decree surprised analysts and regional elites alike. 14 No one expected 
federal reform to be Putin's first project. Putin asserted that his decree, designed 
to strengthen state unity, was supported by'governors, deputies and all citizens 
of Russia. It is possible to say, that in the country, for the first time, there is no 
disagreement about the question of principle: 1s His hyperbole could be excused. 
Few openly challenged the new president, who rode a wave of popularity not 
possessed by a high federal official since the early 1990s. Governors publicly 
endorsed the decree, though many no doubt grumbled in private. 16 By 
announcing the creation of districts without announcing who would be envoys, 
Putin left governors in a tactical dilemma: wondering whether they themselves 
or officials they controlled might be appointed (or at least host the district 
capital), his critics bit their tongues. 17 Pointing to the legal anarchy that had 
been the method and the misery of Yeltsin's presidency, Putin declared, 'It is 
seemingly isolated instances like these, drop by drop, that give rise to separatism, 
which sometimes becomes the springboard for an even more dangerous evil -
international terrorism: 18 Who dared oppose such logic behind the 'dictatorship 
oflaw'? 
Boris Nemtsov, a former governor and leader of the Union of Right Forces, 
was among the first to recognise the key to the decrees: '[E]verything namely 
depends on which figures appear in these posts. It may be that they are just 
run-of-the-mill bureaucrats, and then the whole new system you will call none 
other than decorative.' 19 Putin's choices indicated his resolve: five of the seven 
polpredy held the rank of general in the armed forces. 20 Who polpredy appointed 
as deputies was almost as telling as the selection by Putin of the polpredy 
themselves. It was, perhaps, predictable that the civilian-politicians would gather 
different types of deputies than their colleagues plucked from military positions. 
The entourage of Sergei Kirienko, undoubtedly, was the most professionally 
trained, including such well-known and respected advisors as Vladimir Zorin.21 
The first few months under the new system of federal districts led some to 
suspect that the polpredy, like Yeltsin's envoys, were paper tigers. The combative 
governor of Sverdlovsk Ob last, Eduard Rossel, defiantly went on vacation rather 
than greet Petr Latyshev, arriving in Ekaterinburg to introduce himself to the 
governors of his district. Some polpredy found it difficult to acquire offices or 
even living space.22 Although numerous press conferences and considerable 
media exposure were given to tl1e seven polpredy, work on the ground appeared 
to be no more substantial than under the previous system. Criticism grew that 
the reform was in fact illusory: just another layer of federal bureaucracy. 
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By Fall 2000, however, there were increasing indications that the reform might 
have a bite to match its bark. Polpredy were made full members of the Security 
Council. Julie A. Corwin, analyzing reports from several newspapers, noted 
that polpredy topped the pay scale of federal officials, earning more than four 
times the salary of Putin himself! 23 According to Sergei Samoilov, then chief of 
the Main Territorial Department of the Administration of the President, 
polpredy ranked close to a deputy prime minister in the hierarchy of power.24 
As polpredy and their federal inspectors set to the task of creating a 'unified 
legal space' in the federation, scouring regional constitutions, bilateral treaties 
and laws for conformity or violation of federal norms, Putin strengthened their 
political power by tasking them with the creation of a 'single information space' 
as well. A presidential ukaz in late September stripped regional elites of the 
right to nominate regional directors of Russian state-owned radio and televisi-
on stations. From now on, his envoys would make the recommendations. 25 In 
the Southern Federal District, Viktor Kazantsev established what most observers 
called a 'District Government; a Territorial Collegium bringing together district 
representatives of all federal ministries and agencies (excepting the federal 
procuracy). 26 All districts soon followed such developments with the creation 
of 'security councils' comprised of the regional executives in each district, 
mirroring the larger State Council that Putin had decreed at the federal level to 
win regional acquiescence to his reform of the FC. Circumstantial proof of the 
increasing anxiety of governors about the strengthening of polpredy was the 
proposal of Egor Stroev, Speaker in the FC and Governor of Orenburg Oblast, 
for a law that would delimit the role and powers of polpredy.27 Conflicts between 
the Main Territorial Department and the polpredy led Putin to trim the powers 
of both sides in late December (the former appeared to lose considerable power 
over regional staff and access to the president), subordinate polpredy to the 
control of Aleksandr Voloshin, Chief of the Presidential Administration, with 
an ukaz at the end of January 2001, and dismiss Samoilov in February.28 Eight 
months later, in October, the Ministry for Federation Affairs, Nationality, and 
Migration Policy was abolished and its head, Aleksandr Blokhin, dismissed. 
Few analysts doubted that Putin had accomplished what Yeltsin could not: for 
the first time since the 'War of Laws' had begun, the federal government had 
the clear upper hand. 
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The Quasi-Judicial Power of Presidential Decrees 
Although the federal districts signaled the groundbreaking stage of Putin's 
efforts at federal reform, it was not the first stage. 'Above everything else, the 
state is the law; Putin exclaimed in his address to the nation introducing his 
reforms. Putin claimed that more than 20% of regional legislation was 
unconstitutional - and swore to combat it. 29 
Eight days prior to naming his polpredy, Putin, by his own decree, suspended 
the legal force of a decree made by the president of Ingushetia, Ruslan Aushev, 
and a resolution by the Ingush Government. 30 The Ingush president's decree, 
nearly 2112 years old, improved collection of gas and electric payments in the 
republic; the government resolution, executing a nearly three-year-old decree 
of the Ingush president, involved licenses to foreign workers. These regional 
acts, Putin's decree asserted, violated the Constitution, federal law and the federal 
tax code. That same day, Putin issued another decree suspending a nearly year-
old resolution by the governor of Amur Oblast that permitted Russian citizens 
access to a bordering Chinese trading complex. 31 ITAR-TASS reported that an 
additional fifteen such decrees were expected soon, on advice from the 
Procurator-General.32 Two days after his decree on the new federal districts, 
Putin decreed the suspension of a two-year-old resolution made by the governor 
of Smolensk Oblast that established levies for transport-related environmental 
contamination.33 According to Putin's decree, this contradicted two federal laws 
and a resolution of the federal government. More decrees suspending regional 
legal acts soon followed: against Adygeia, on 7 June; Tver on 12 June; Tula on 
12 August; Ingushetia on I September; and Adygeia again on 9 September. 34 
This was Putin's first expression of the refrain of his federal reforms, the 
strengthening of the president's 'vertical powers' in the Federation. Putin based 
these powers on four articles of the federal Constitution. Article 90 gives the 
president expansive powers to enact gap-filling decrees and orders (rasporiazhe-
niia) on any subject not otherwise prohibited by or contradicting the Constitu-
tion and/or federal law.35 Putin's decrees, however, were of a special type made 
in reliance on a relatively untested article of the Constitution: Article 85, § 2. 
Pending ultimate resolution of the issue by an appropriate court, the federal 
executive has the power to suspend the acts of executive organs of state power 
on all levels of government for violation of the Constitution, federal law or 
presidential decrees.36 This quasi-judicial power is the practical expression of 
the authority expressed in two other articles: Article 77, § 2 and Article 80, § 2. 
The former provides the specific philosophical backing for the 'vertical power: 
providing that 'federal organs of executive power and the organs of executive 
80 
PUTIN'S FEDERAL REFORMS 
power of the subjects of the RF shall form a unified system of executive power in 
the Russian Federation.' The latter article names the president as 'guarantor of 
the Constitution of the RF: Neither the legislative nor the judicial branch of 
the federal government is given that powerfully symbolic - and vague -
authority. 
Together, these articles give the president extraordinary implicit powers well 
beyond those powers specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and which 
have led some political scientists to label the Russian system one of 'super-
presidentialism: As Danilenko and Burnham, two respected legal scholars, have 
noted, 'Although the Constitution does not place the President above the three 
main branches of government, some commentators argue that he may act (as 
the French President does) as 'an arbiter' among the legislative, executive and 
judicial branches of government.' 37 
Although the Constitutional Court has ruled that the President has the 
constitutional power to issue temporary decrees to fill gaps in federal law, the 
opinion was not unanimous.38 As Justice Luchin noted in a powerful dissent: 
This 'self-regulation,' not knowing any kind of limitation, is dangerous and 
incompatible with the principle of the division of powers and other values of a rule-
of-law state. The President may not decide any kind of questions if they do not flow 
from his authority as provided in the Constitution. He is not able to lean on his so-
called 'latent (implied)' authorities. Use of them in the absence of a stable constitutional 
legal order or legality is fraught with negative consequences: the weakening of the 
mechanism of checks and balances, the strengthening of one branch of power at the 
expense of another, the beginning of confrontation between them.39 
While lacunae in federal law are a serious problem and revision of certain parts 
of the federal constitution is obviously important, caution must be taken not 
to further aggravate existing problems. The federal executive's power to suspend 
acts of regional executive branches is an extraordinary encroachment on two 
core features of federal government. First, it fundamentally weakens the 
distinction between federal and regional government. No proponent of sus-
tainable federal government in Russia could sensibly advocate further decentra-
lisation of authority, but care must be taken not to fall victim to the dangers of 
over-centralisation of power in Russia in response to this debilitating deflation 
of federal power. This is precisely the view Putin advocates in his appeal for the 
'strengthening of the vertical' of executive power. All executive branches, at 
every level of government, would fall subject to the will of the federal executive 
branch. Second, having weakened the separation of powers between federal 
government and the constituent subjects of the federation, Article 85 encroaches 
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on the division of powers between the executive branch and the judicial branch 
of government, on all levels. The president, by suspending the legal force of a 
decree or resolution of a different executive authority, undertakes an act of 
legal judgement that the Russian Constitution accords, rightly, the judicial 
branch. While suspensive decrees may ultimately be overruled by'an appropriate 
court; the initial judgement of (and penalty for) unconstitutionality is made, 
not by the court, but by the executive. That judgement, lodged in tersely worded 
decrees is extremely conclusory: no explanation or rationale is provided. Even 
the institution of the procuracy does not have the authority to pronounce on 
the constitutionality of an act before resolution in the courts. 
One month after Putin's initial reform package, the federal Constitutional 
Court issued an opinion ( opredelenie) on the constitutions of Adygeia, Bashkor-
tostan, Ingushetia, Komi, North Ossetia and Tatarstan that further strengthened 
the president's 'power vertical.' 40 This highly critical document rejected the 
claims to sovereignty (several of which bordered on the doctrine of nullification) 
repeatedly made by these republics. The supremacy of the federal Constitution 
was (again) reasserted over all other constitutions and charters, including those 
predating the 1993 federal Constitution.41 The 'treaty-constitutional' federalism 
favoured by the regions was categorically rejected. This opinion specifically 
noted tllat subjects of the Federation 
... may not change the priorities established by the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation for the action of laws and other federal normative legal acts, limit their 
application, suspend their activity, or introduce any kind of procedures or mechanisms 
for the settlement of legal conflicts that constrain the action of these acts that is not 
foreseen by the Constitution of the Russian Federation or by federal laws.42 
In other words, while the Federal President possessed the power to suspend 
regional executive acts deemed by him to conflict with the federal Constitution 
prior to any judicial determination of that fact, regional elites did not possess a 
parallel power to suspend federal acts deemed by them to be in conflict with 
the federal Constitution. For those who saw executive political pressure behind 
pronouncements of the Court, 43 this opinion signalled that a battle of decrees 
would not be tolerated. Only the federal president had that power. 
Another Constitutional Court decision (postanovlenie) against the Republic 
of Altai, announced a few days earlier, held that republic's constitution to be 
riddled with violations of federal law, especially regarding sovereignty. According 
to the Court: 
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The Constitution of the Russian Federation binds the sovereignty of the Russian 
Federation, its constitutional-legal status and authority, and also the constitutional-
legal status and authority of the republics that compose the Russian Federation, not 
by their will on the basis of a treaty, but by the will of the multi-national Russian 
people - the carriers and sole source of power in the Russian Federation, which, 
realising the principles of equality under the law and the self-determination of peoples, 
constitutes the rebirth of Russia's sovereign statehood as a historically fully developed 
state entity in its present federal structure [ ... ] Recognition then of sovereignty for 
republics, when all other subjects of the Russian Federation do not possess it, would 
violate the constitutional equality under the law of subjects of the Russian Federation; 
its realisation is made impossible in principle, in so far as subjects of the Russian 
Federation, not possessing sovereignty, by their own status may not be equal under 
the law with sovereign states.44 
Large portions of this ruling were reprinted verbatim in the Constitutional 
Court's opinion later that month. It foreshadowed with one republic the 
sweeping denunciation of regional claims to sovereignty made subsequently 
against six others and, by implication, all republics. The rulings of the Court -
a court of discretionary jurisdiction - at such a charged moment in Russian 
federal politics was considered by some to be more political warning than legal 
ruling. Putin's representative to the Court, Mikhail Mitiukov, asserted that the 
Altai decision 
gives a juridical stamp to the initiatives of the President ... [for] the strengthening of a 
federal state and guarantees of the conformity of regional legislation to federal law .... 
The essence of this document, in my view, is that it puts an end to the so-called ideology 
of sovereignisation of the subjects of the Federation. Their sovereignty is not 
boundless.'45 
Not all regional observers shared this view. A senior official of the Permanent 
Mission of the Republic of Bashkortostan in Moscow observed shortly after 
the decision: 'In Russia, the political process is more important than the law 
itself. So the agreements of our president with the RF president are more 
important than the law. The Constitutional Court of Russia is just a body, highly 
respected, but just a body of the RF. It has nothing to do with the Republic of 
Bashkortostan - we have our own Constitutional Court:46 In Tatarstan, Tatar 
nationalists presented that republic's parliament and president with a bill 
declaring the decision invalid on its territory.47 
That attitude would radically change as the presidential envoys flexed their 
inuscles and Putin's other proposals became federal law. Putin's decrees quickly 
captured the attention of regional executives, who leapt to amend controverted 
laws and decrees and, in some cases, even constitutions. Days after the opinion 
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of the Constitutional Court was delivered, the republic of Tuva, neither named 
in the cases before the Constitutional Court nor targeted by Putin's executive 
decrees, announced the completion of a massive amendment of its constitu-
tion.48 In Kalmykia, President Kirsan Iliumzhinov announced the total compli-
ance of his republic with federal law.49 
In less than two months, Putin and the Court had threatened the constitutio-
nality of legal activity in a dozen subjects of the Federation, eight of which 
were republics.50 Extension of the 'executive power vertical' would not stop 
there. In conjunction with Putin's next wave oflegislative reforms, soon all the 
republics and regions of the RF would be pressed by Putin's presidential envoys, 
the federal inspectors they appointed, and the procuracy and Ministry of Justice 
to bring their laws and government activity into conformity with federal norms. 
In September 2001, a new federal presidential commission charged with the 
(seemingly perennial) task of demarcating federal and regional authority, 
intensified scrutiny of bilateral treaties. With over two score treaties and more 
than 500 agreements still considered valid by at least one of the signatory-
governments to them, the Kremlin announced a deadline: there would be a 
'unified constitutional space' in the RF by 24 July 2002.51 Just how bilateral 
treaties, which had taken years to negotiate, would be unraveled in a few months 
was not dear. Since treaties had never been ratified, one Kremlin official declared 
them to occupy the bottom rung of the hierarchy of law; presumably, there 
would be no problem, then, in discarding them.52 This was, of course, always 
the great risk carried by these documents, the product of highly personalised 
political relations unsupported by ratification or other procedures that would 
have strengthened their legal force. 
There is, however, some risk to the steady stream of cancelled decrees, judicial 
determinations, sabre-rattling commissions and strict deadlines. To be sure, 
from the point of view of a transition to democracy, many of the regional decrees 
that Putin suspended were dear abuses of power. Many of these presidents and 
governors have had little interest in the development of democratic structures 
beyond the Potemkin villages they construct in (often futile) attempts to attract 
investment. But, from the point of view of federal development, Putin's cure 
seemed at times to risk side-effects as unappealing as the disease. In an attempt 
to deal with long-term violations of the law, Putin sought to solve the problem 
through his 'dictatorship oflaw.' But would his dictatorship know when to stop? 
Or, a victim of their own successes, would federal authorities continue to 
strengthen the 'executive vertical' with ever increasing centralisation of 
authority? 
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Putin's legislative Reforms 
Having established his federal districts in mid-May, sweeping legislative reforms 
followed in June. Putin sought the following: first, to oust regional executives 
and parliament chairmen from their dual positions as members of the upper 
chamber of the Federal Assembly, the FC; and second, having weakened their 
influence on federal lawmaking (and removed their senatorial immunity from 
prosecution), to force regional laws and lawmakers into conformity with federal 
norms by threat of dismissal from their regional positions for repeated 
malfeasance.53 The FC, predictably, refused to drink the hemlock that Putin 
offered. Nor was it willing to permit federal condemnation of regional politicians 
(who, if the first reform succeeded in removing their immunity as senators, 
could well include themselves). While, in the latter case, the Duma was able to 
override (with the required two-thirds majority) the upper chamber's veto, a 
special conciliation commission had to be established to pass a substantially 
amended FC reform: the hemlock was sweetened and its drinking postponed. 
Putin achieved his objectives through a combination of strong political pressure 
(his public approval ratings were at record levels) and a willingness to offer the 
occasional political compromise. A third 'reform' - extending to regional elites 
a power to dismiss local self-government officials that paralleled the power 
Putin would hold over regional executives and legislatures -provoked compara-
tively less controversy. It was, and was widely held to be, a sop to regional power 
aimed to make passage of Putin's other reforms more palatable. Putin's new 
power to dismiss regional executives and legislatures was circumscribed in most 
cases by the multi-staged involvement of the judiciary. When the dust had 
cleared, however, Putin's presidential powers had grown significantly and federal 
authority, if not immediately strengthened, had been positioned to reassert 
itself on a new political playing field. 
Putin understood that his fundamental changes could not be enacted by 
presidential decree. At the very least, these reforms required legislative action. 
Some critics argued that even promulgation as federal laws was inadequate for 
the scale of the reforms proposed - constitutional amendment was needed. In 
the end, Putin succeeded in winning support in the legislative branch both for 
the substance of his reforms and for the sufficiency of ordinary law for their 
adoption. 
Putin's apparent victory in the Federal Assembly presents serious problems 
of executive overreach, threatening an already fragile balance of powers (not 
only between branches of government but also between federal and regional 
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levels of government). On the eve of the introduction of his reforms, Putin 
shared his objectives on national television: 'The general aim of these draft 
laws is to make both the executive and legislative power really work, bring a 
true meaning to the constitutional principle of division between the two 
branches of power and consolidate the vertical structure of executive power.' 54 
Putin's Orwellian 'true meaning' of the separation of powers meant 
'consolidation' and a 'vertical' executive power extending from the Moscow 
Kremlin to local organs of self-government! As one respected legal scholar 
observed, Putin's federal reforms 'unwittingly unleashed a war; the resolution 
of which would neither be quick or predictable.55 
Reform No 1: Perestroika at the FC 
The first and most dramatic reform on Putin's agenda was the perestroika 
(restructuring) of the upper chamber of the Federal Assembly, the FC. The 
Russian parliament is a bicameral legislature: 450 deputies sit in the lower 
chamber (the Duma); in the upper chamber (the FC) sit 178 senators. Virtually 
all federal systems operate bicameral systems,56 and it is not difficult to under-
stand why. The sometimes competing, sometimes complementary impulses of 
federalism in a polity naturally suggest more than one collection of lawmakers 
who, although chosen according to different principles of representation, are 
united under one legislative roof. Both houses are required to make law. Madi-
son famously outlined the benefits of an upper chamber in The Federalist Papers, 
N.62: as an 'impediment ... against improper acts oflegislation' by passing bills 
twice through deliberative bodies organized to represent different interests; the 
senate also acts as a shield against 'the impulse of sudden and violent passions, 
... seduced by factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions: A 
bicameral legislature acts as a bulwark against what Tsebelis and Money have 
described as three tyrannies: Publius' classic protection against a 'tyranny of 
tl1e majority' in the veto one chamber holds vis-a-vis tl1e other; protection 
against a 'tyranny of the minority' by demanding a more complex assent to 
legislation than a simple, unicameral majority;57 finally, protection against the 
'tyranny of the individual; who by tl1e power to set an agenda can control the 
outcome, made more difficult because of the plurality of agendas.58 
Since 1995, tl1e Council had been comprised of senators sitting ex officio: 
the respective head of the executive branch (president or governor) and 
legislative branch (speaker or chairman) of each region.59 This was not always 
the case. The RF's first legislature was the Supreme Soviet, a holdover from the 
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(then still existing) Soviet Union. This body was constituted from am uch larger 
Congress of People's Deputies, directly elected for the first time in March 1990. 
Boris Yeltsin was elected chairman of the new Parliament and quickly fostered 
its self-image as a populist body demanding ever-increasing powers from 
Gorbachev's central authority. A year later, when Yeltsin traded his post as head 
of the legislative branch to become Russia's first President, he was himself forced 
to confront the riotous legislature he had created. A paralysing conflict between 
Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet resulted in the October 1993 storming of the 
White House, the Parliament's home, and adoption ofYeltsin's new Constitution, 
which established a bicameral legislature. The FC was directly elected in its 
entirety in 1993, with two seats chosen (and rarely more than two or three 
candidates to choose from) on a first-past-the-post basis for each of the eighty-
nine constituencies. Interestingly, however, Yeltsin's Constitution did not 
explicitly demand election of the upper chamber, as it did for the lower chamber 
(the Duma) of the Federal Assembly. The 'manner of formation' of the FC was 
left to be established by federal law.60 With much effort, and only after the 
Duma overrode the veto of its sister chamber, a new law established the ex 
officio scheme of appointment employed from 1995 until 2000.61 
Initially, the bargain must have seemed irresistible to Yeltsin. Having forcefully 
dispatched his enemies in the old parliament, Yeltsin's new law filled the upper 
chamber with a majority of men who owed their regional positions to 
appointment by him. He also hoped for a less cantankerous body of lawmakers, 
who by the very nature of their dual appointment would behave more like a 
part-time legislature. The perks of office (e.g. apartments in Moscow) controlled 
by the Kremlin's state property administration further ensured a more passive 
upper chamber. As Yeltsin soon learned, however, he could not buy the love of 
the FC. As more and more governors and republican presidents won election to 
their regional executive positions, their allegiance to Yeltsin waned. Local 
constituencies gave regional elites the luxury of characterising the centre as stingy 
adversary, in much the same manner that Yeltsin had attacked Gorbachev. No 
longer beholden to their patron, governors and presidents took seriously their 
roles as senators, sometimes to the visible frustration of President Yeltsin. 
Putin immediately recognized the problem such a chamber posed for his 
efforts to strengthen federal executive power. Any attempt to weaken regional 
autonomy or limit regional jurisdiction would be opposed by senators whose 
Personal power was decreased. Efforts to force out of office the most recalcitrant 
~nd rebellious governors and presidents would by stymied by the senatorial 
llllmunity from prosecution regional executives enjoyed. Reform would have 
to be multi-staged, beginning with a change of faces. 62 
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The initial proposal from the Kremlin was draconian: senators were to be 
elected by each region's legislature. Although the regional executive had the 
power to nominate his representative, the advice and consent of the regional . 
legislature was required for both senatorial appointments. The post of senator • 
was explicitly defined as a 'professional-permanent' position, which meant that 
members of the Federal Duma, regional legislatures, and local self-government, 
elected state or municipal officials and 'category!\. state officials were expressly 
prohibited from service. Election of new senators to the reformed upper 
chamber would be completed no later than 1 April 2001. Regional heads of 
executive and legislative branches would enjoy, at most, a nine-month grace 
period of immunities and privileges. 
As expected, the FC expressed strong opposition, voting 129-13 against 
reform.63 The Duma, therefore, became a critical player, where 300 votes (out 
of 450 deputies) would be required to override the upper chamber's veto.64 
Although Putin had achieved tl1is support in the Duma's first three votes, his 
margin was extremely narrow. He was quick to signal that his bill was not written 
in stone; he was willing to compromise.65 Senators could remain in office for 
the full length of their terms - January 1, 2002 at the very latest - in what was 
termed a 'soft rotation' from power. A joint conciliatory commission of senators 
and Duma deputies hammered out further compromises, though it worked 
under the shadow of the Duma's override powers.66 Under pressure, the com-
mission took less than a fortnight to arrive at a compromise: senatorial appoint-
ments by regional executives would stand unless their legislatures rejected the 
candidate by a special majority. Regional executives could, with the same limita-
tion, recall their representative. With these additional amendments, and the 
Duma's super-majority a sword of Damocles hanging over their heads, the 
Senators accepted the reform as a fait accompli.67 
From the point of view of Putin's efforts to strengthen federal authority, reform 
of the FC was obviously important. Most crucially, Putin removed regional elites 
from their dual posts as federal senators without serious revolt, stripping them in 
the process both of immunity against federal prosecution and influence over 
federal policy-making. Many observers feared that this was only the first step in a 
process that would strip the Council of its competences, reducing an important 
check on both the executive branch and the lower chamber of the Parliament as 
well. Some, viewing Putin's reforms as a complete package, saw sinister connections 
between the reformation of the upper chamb~r and the creation of governors-
general, transforming federal governance into an executive capped pyramid.68 
Egor Stroev, Chairman of the FC, expressed his fear that Putin's so-called reform 
was the first stage in the 'dismantling' of the upper chamber; the result, he warned, 
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would weaken the parliament as a federal representative organ for regional 
interests, and thus, the prospects for federalism and democracy in Russia: 'there 
will result a serious weakening of the federal bases of Russian statehood, for a 
democratic federation with a unicameral parliament is nonsense.'69 One 
outspoken critic of the reform in the FC, President of Chuvashia Nikolai Fedorov, 
threatened to challenge the reform in the Constitutional Court, contending that 
'all honest lawyers admit that these reforms and laws are essentially revising the 
existing constitutional structure of the RF ... '70 
In an effort to appease the soon-to-be ex-senators, Putin created a new forum 
in which they could sit. In early September 2000, as he had hinted throughout 
the summer, Putin formed a 'State Council:71 This body was directly subordi-
nated to the executive branch, having been created by presidential decree.72 Its 
composition included all eighty-nine regional executives. A smaller presidium 
comprised of the seven regional executives chosen by the President on a six-
month rotating basis, ensured that the reform would be tempered with the 
promise of the president's ear.73 At its first meeting the Presidium established 
for itself monthly meetings with the president, while the Council would meet 
in plenary sessions only four times a year. While Putin made assurances that 
the State Council was merely an advisory body (though given the president's 
extensive decree powers, such a role was not to be downplayed) some suggested 
that its establishment presaged a transfer of competence from the FC, a move 
that virtually all critical analysts agreed would require constitutional amend-
ment.74 
Beyond the substantive questions of competences and personnel, reform of 
the FC raised procedural questions that touched not only on federal 
development, but on the transition from authoritarianism. An optimist would 
contend that Russia's constitutional system had functioned well: following the 
legitimate legislative initiative of a new president, disagreement in the legislative 
branch was expeditiously resolved in a conciliatory commission, compromise 
legislation worked out, and a law passed by large majorities in botl1 houses. 
Threats to take the political battle to the Constitutional Court quickly lost 
support.75 On the other hand, the pressure placed on the FC, operating under 
the shadow of the Duma's super-majority and the untested rule-of-law 
credentials of Vladimir Putin, meant that conciliation on such an issue was 
hardly genuine. Senators accepted the reforms grudgingly, still under the threat 
of a Duma override, and with the feeling that they had little choice but to accede 
to the demands of a powerful new president. 
Implementation of the reform of the FC moved slowly. Under the compro-
mise known as the 'soft rotation,' regional executives and chairs of regional 
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legislatures sitting ex officio in the FC had until 1 January 2002 to comply with: 
the new law. According to the FC website, as of 2 November 2001, only 85 
senators (of 178) were working in the FC on a 'permanent' basis, as prescribed 
by the new law.76 Only fifteen of these new members were from republics.77 In 
nine republics, no changeover had been accomplished at all. In only three 
republics (Marii El, Udmurtia, and Khakassia) had both senators been newly 
selected according to the law. 
Reform No 2: Federal Influence over Regional Legislatures and 
Executives 
Regional executive and legislative branches of government were also targets of 
reform from above. Putin wanted to install the mechanisms that would give 
him real power according to his formula for 'strengthening of the executive 
vertical.' His draft legislation amended a 1999 law that had attempted to 
standardise baseline principles for regional legislative and executive structures 
(e.g. maximum lengths oflegislative terms, deputies' immunities, use of official 
seals, procedural regularity, etc.), often merely by repetition or elaboration of 
principles set in the Constitution (e.g. elections, jurisdictional competences, 
guarantee of control by legislatures of expenses required for their operation, 
etc.).78 Among its most significant provisions, Yeltsin's old law appears to have 
outlawed the not uncommon republican practice of permitting members of 
republican legislatures simultaneously to hold official positions as executive 
heads oflocal administrations (a post akin to mayor of a district) -though this 
prohibition has been observed mainly in the breach by the republics.79 
Putin amended this law to give the federal executive the power to dismiss 
regional legislatures and executives for extended and/or gross violations of 
federal law. The actual legislation, however, was less extreme than what had 
been imagined, thanks mainly to the cumbersome and lengthy procedure 
through which this power could be realised. Although the law gave the president 
a considerable power to threaten regional politicians with dismissal, the law's 
procedures - if followed as outlined in the law - provided numerous opportu-
nities over a long period of time and multiple stages of action by which those 
threatened could avoid fulfilment of the threat. Legislatures and executives were 
given six months to put their legal houses in order, after which time normative 
legal acts recognised by courts to contradict federal law would be susceptible to 
the provisions of the new law. 80 
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The involvement of multiple authorities and deliberately long periods for 
compliance limit the severity of this reform. The strongest potential bulwark 
against abuse of this new power, however, is the involvement of the judicial 
branch at the initial stages of the process. The judiciary has a role to play as 
shield against the executive's sword and against the legislature's purse, and is 
an invaluable institution of the rule-of-law for democracies. The authority of 
the court to demand the rational use of power - to demand reasons behind 
executive action - and to command adherence by political actors to legal 
principles (in other words, to establish and protect Cass Sunstein's 'republic of 
reasons' in a deliberative democracy) is extraordinarily important. Though 
predictions are always hazardous, the role of the judiciary in this process may 
well turn out to be what preserves the legal integrity - and prevents the 
capricious use of - this new law. 
Nevertheless, a grant of power to the federal executive to initiate a process of 
dismissal of popularly elected officials and even whole legislatures for derogation 
from the constitutional order is an extraordinary authority in a federal system. 
By 'strengthening the vertical of executive power,' this law emasculates the 
separation of powers between the federal and regional governments. Regional 
executives receive their mandate to govern in popular elections, not by commis-
sion from the federal executive. To subject them to discharge - either by the 
initiative of a federal executive ukaz or, worse, on the mere accusation (not, it 
must be emphasised, upon conviction) by the federal Procurator-General- is 
as much a threat to the separation between regional and federal administration 
as it is to the political life of the official. Regional legislatures also receive, 
collectively, an electoral mandate that is entirely separate from that of the federal 
legislature that is now empowered to dissolve them, impliedly on a theory of 
collective culpability of all deputies for violating as a body the constitutional 
order. Those deputies who vote 'correctly' are not saved from the fate that awaits 
their stubborn colleagues. 
This is not to say that violation of the supremacy of the federal Constitution 
or federal law is tolerable;81 nor does it diminish the flagrant disregard for federal 
legal authority that has been the rule and not the exception in post-Soviet Russia. 
These dangers (in the form of philosophies of state sovereignty and 'treaty-
constitutional' conceptions of the federal compact, support for the principle of 
nullification, secessionism, or simple nonfeasance) have been recurring themes 
of post-Soviet regional politics. But the powers granted the federal authorities 
by this reform are so extreme on the continuum of federal systems as to be 
virtually off the register. 
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An underlying acceptance of the role of the rule of law (and by extension 
courts in general) as a neutral arbiter, rather than political weapon, is profoundly 
lacking in Putin's reforms. The destructive double legacy of Soviet conceptions 
of law as a political tool or weapon and federalism as a mere administrative 
device for centralisation, is glaringly apparent in the perceived need for federal 
dismissal of regionally elected officials and legislatures. The experience of other 
federations has generally led to an acceptance, even in the most politically 
charged moments, of the rule of law (interpreted by courts of law) as the 
unshakeable bedrock for the 'rules of the game.' In the United States, for example, 
dismissal of state officials by federal authorities (either executive or legislative) 
for violation of the federal constitution is simply unimaginable.82 While it was 
conceivable that a federal executive could enforce Supreme Court-ordered 
integration of public schools in the 1950s, for example, there could be no serious 
discussion of a federally-sponsored eviction of elected state governors who, in 
every imaginable way, sought to defy the Court, the Congress and the 
President. 83 Nor was there room to imagine that the angry legislative resolutions 
passed by many southern states reacting against the opinion of the Court could 
be grounds for federally ordered dissolution of those elected bodies. The Court, 
and the country as a federal system, relied on the authority of the judiciary 
(remarkably, even when federal relations were at their most strained) to declare 
the rule for all and leave to the executive branch its enforcement. 
There are still other considerable grounds for serious concerns about abuse 
of presidential discretion. The rather vague power of the President to 
temporarily discharge regional executives is extremely severe. 84 Only an 
accusation (not a conviction, or even a scheduled trial) is required for exercise 
of this power. An order by an 'appropriate' court is not required at any stage of 
its use. Nothing is said about what stage in the criminal investigative process 
the 'temporary' discharge terminates. Given that the period of time between 
accusation and trial can extend to years (and that, even following an acquittal, 
re-investigation and re-trial is permitted by the Constitution), a regional 
executive may be confronted with an interminable 'temporary' suspension from 
office. Furthermore, no limitations are put on the exercise of this power, for 
example, in the final days of a gubernatorial election, or even to disqualify an 
incumbent executive as a candidate in the next elections. The new law does not 
specify what constitutes a 'grave' or 'especially grave' crime. There is also no 
built-in waiting period for the exercise of this power, as adopted for the other 
mechanisms for dismissal provided in this law. This is the power that regional 
executives truly feared, 85 especially as their senatorial immunities were taken 
away by the law on the Federal Assembly.86 
92 
PUTIN'S FEDERAL REFORMS 
Reform No 3: Federal Influence over Local Self-Government 
As noted above, Yeltsin rapidly lost the power to appoint and dismiss regional 
executives as increasing numbers of regional politicians won popular mandates 
in open (if not always contested) elections. This was not the case for the 
relationship between regional executives and the heads oflocal self-government, 
the lowest level of government in the regions. In many cases, heads of local 
self-government were appointed by the executive, responsive (because 
responsible) to their political patrons rather than to political parties or the 
electorate. Oftentimes, heads oflocal executive administrations served ex officio 
as deputies in regional legislatures, according to the same formula by which 
the FC had formerly been composed. When these local executives owed their 
posts to the governor or president of the region, the result was a flagrant violation 
of the principle of separation of powers. As noted above, this practice was 
outlawed in the Yeltsin administration, though compliance seems to have been 
negligible in the absence of strong enforcement. 
Putin sought to change this practice, again by submitting a Yeltsin-era law 
to amendment.87 These amendments did to local self-government what Putin's 
strengthening of the executive vertical did to the relationship between the federal 
executive branch and the executive and legislative branches of regional 
governments.88 Upon a finding by a court (which court is unspecified) that a 
normative legal act promulgated by a local representative or administrative 
body contradicts either federal or regional laws, or otherwise amounts to a 
'violation (disparagement)' of human or civil rights 'or offensive of another 
injury; those organs are required to revoke the act and publish the ruling of the 
court. In the event of non-compliance with the judicial order, the representative 
organ is subject to dismissal and the head of the administrative body subject to 
early discharge from duty. The procedure for discharge is also similar, although 
the required preliminary written warning could come either from the initiative 
of the regional legislature (to warn the local representative organ), or by the 
regional executive (to warn both the representative and executive local organs). 
Following issuance of the warning, the local organs at risk of dismissal have 
one month to comply with the original court order; after that time, but within 
six months of the court order, the local representative body may be dismissed 
by the regional legislature (by passage of a law), and the local executive body 
l11ay be dismissed by the regional executive (by issuance of an ukaz). If the 
regional power lay dormant, three months after the court order the President 
of the RF may introduce legislation to the State Duma to dismiss the 
representative organ, and on his own authority dismiss the local executive. New 
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elections would be triggered immediately by any dismissals. 89 As before, courts 
have the ultimate authority to review dismissals (where citizens who could claim 
that the dismissal worked a violation of their rights or legal interests would 
have standing to appeal dismissals). A six-month grace period was established, 
as in the other reform, before retroactive enforcement of decisions by courts 
on existing violations would commence. 
While bracing the procedure for dismissal with judicial orders on either side 
could potentially de-politicise disputes by maintaining rule-of-law standards 
for judgement oflocal authorities and abuses of administrative discretion, the 
new procedure presents several problems as well. The same criticism of Russia's 
courts, slowly emerging from their traditional place under the thumb of political 
powers, could be laid before this 'reform.' In other governmental systems, 
violations of the law by officials of the executive branch result in orders to 
comply with law or be impeached. In the United States, impeachment has 
predominantly settled on the removal of corrupt judges, although in its original 
conception (deeply influenced by the English common law tradition) 
impeachment was put forward also as a means to restrain abuses of power by 
the chief executive and his appointed officials.90 Usually, impeachment is by a 
legislature (or some part of it) sitting as a court of impeachment. The point is 
that the procedure is a judicial one, with all the attendant safeguards and rules 
of evidence. Under Putin's law, impeachment is by decree of the next higher 
executive in the chain of command. 
Another problem is the use of a power to dissolve legislatures as an im-
peaching device. 'Aggrandisement of the legislative at the expense of the other 
departments' was a serious enough concern for James Madison to devote several 
articles of The Federalist Papers to its attention. 91 But his solutions - bicame-
ralism, an executive veto, and the competing interests of different constituencies 
in a 'compound republic,' i.e. federalism itself - did not include the power of 
the executive and judicial branches to discharge the legislative branch from 
power.92 The legislature, as a body, was not subject to discharge by the executive, 
even if it passed legislation declared by the Supreme Court to be in flagrant 
and gross violation of the Constitution. The solution to the problem of how to 
deal with a recalcitrant parliament that persisted .in passing unconstitutional 
legislation was either to rely on popular displeasure at election time or to rely 
on the executive branch to refuse to implement the law declared by the judiciary 
to be unconstitutional. 
The Russian tradition has pointed in the opposite direction, and it is to this 
legacy that the source of the idea of prorogation-as-impeachment might be 
attributed. One of the most debilitating legacies of the Soviet era has been the 
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continued approach to law as a political weapon rather than as an administrative 
tool: law is a means to crush opponents when in power, to weaken them when 
in opposition. Yeltsin's baptism by parliamentary fire in 1992-1993 showed the 
depths to which such thinking could sink. The remedy there was executive 
dissolution of the Parliament,93 followed by the use of the military to shell 
parliamentary opponents (who themselves had declared the executive power 
null and void due to misuse) into submission. Putin has characterised his own 
'reforms' as restoration of the vertical executive power, indicating that for him, 
autonomy from central control is an aberration to be corrected.94 
Putin's reforms were, more than anything else, a reaction to Yeltsin's federal 
legacy of weak federal institutions and lack of consensus on basic questions of 
sovereignty and intergovernmental relations in a federal state. Writing while 
Putin was still acting president, Vladimir Lysenko, the Deputy Chairman of the 
Duma's Committee on Federal and Regional Policies, described a model of 
centralisation he called 
guided democracy, or a soft authoritarian regime - an attempt to consolidate power 
for the completion of economic reforms in the country by way of the creation of a 
regime of personal power of the president of the country and the limitation of a number 
of democratic institutions and procedures.95 
In many ways, Lysenko's program presaged Putin's federal reforms, including 
reform of the FC, reform of the system of presidential representatives, and 
strengthening (i.e. centralisation) of the power to enforce the supremacy of 
federal legal and economic (including budget and t'!x) systems. This approach, 
Lysenko asserted, was already slowly beginning to operate in Russia and should 
be encouraged: centralisation of federal power and an even stronger president 
were prerequisites for a 'developed democracy; only after which could there be 
a return to decentralised federalism. 96 
Neither Lysenko nor Putin could provide satisfactory assurances that 'soft 
authoritarianism' (in Lysenko's phrase) or 'the dictatorship of law' and the 
'strengthening of the vertical of executive federal power'(in Putin's words) would 
not be medicine worse than the disease. Is Russia doomed to decide between 
an increasingly centralized federal system and a system increasingly at risk of 
disintegration, as Riker predicted for all federal systems? On a more nuanced 
continuum of federal systems, which direction does Russia face? 
95 
BEYOND THE GARDEN RING 
Bibliography 
Akopov, P. (2000 ), 'Snova v odnoi sviazke: Tuva otkazyvaetsia ot prava na otdelenie'. Izvestiia, 
1 July, 2000, 2. 
Andrusenko, L. (2000), 'Kalmykiia sdalas' dobrovol'no: Respublikanskie zakony priveli v 
sootvetstvie s Konstitutsiei RF'. Nezavisimaia gazeta, 10 June, 2000, 3. 
Berger, R. (1999), Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems. 2"d ed. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. 
Bronshtein, B. (2000), 'Vosstanovit' nezavisimost''. Izvestia, 9 August 2000. 
Aleksei Chernyshev, A. (2001 ), 'Novosti. Dal'nii Vostok privedut v sootvetstvie'. Kommersant 
-daily, 2 November 2001, 2. 
Corwin, J.A. (2000a), 'Senators Reject Bill Disbanding Upper House'. RFE/RL Newsline, 28 
June 2000, 4, 125 (Part I). 
Corwin, J.A. (2000b), 'State Council Presidium Holds First Meeting'. RFE/RL Newsline, 2 
October 2000, 4, 190 (Part I). 
Corwin, J.A. (200Ja), 'Least Seniority, Highest Pay?' RFE!RL Newsline, 12 January 2001), 5, 8 
(Part I). 
Corwin, J.A. (200lb), 'Putin Makes Far East Governor An Offer He Can't Refuse'. RFEIRL 
Newsline, 6 February 2001, 5, 25 (Part I). 
Corwin, J.A. (200 le), 'Power Sharing Agreements to be Fixed- Or Else'. RFE!RL Newsline, 12 
October 2001, 5, 194 (Part I). 
Corwin, J.A. (200ld), 'Kozak Gives Regions Deadline To Fix Agreements'. RFE/RL Russian 
Federation Report, 17 October 2001, 3, 29 (Part I). 
Danilenko, G.M. - W. Burnham (1999), Law and Legal System of the Russian Federation. New 
York. 
Filipov, D. (2001), 'Russians Still Shiver As Governor Is Ousted'. Boston Globe, 6 February 
2001, A9. 
Fuller, E. (2000), RFE/RL Russian Federation Report, 14 June 2000, 2, 22. 
Goble, P. (2001 ), 'Justice Minsitry Plans Accords with Federation Subjects'. Radio Free Europe! 
Radio Liberty Newsline (2001), 5, 210 (Part I). 
Goble, P. (2000), 'Tatarstan Official Says Unitary Approach Undercuts Democracy'. Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (2000), 4, 151 (Part I). 
Goble, P. - J.A. Corwin (2001), 'Putin Sacks Energy Minister, Makes Far East Governor An 
Offer He Can't Refuse'. RFE/RL Newsline 6 February 2001, 5, 25 (Part I). 
Gunther, G. - K.M. Sullivan ( 1997), Constitutional Law. 13'h Ed., Westbury, New York. 
Jack, A. (2000), 'Council of Russia's governors to gain new powers'. Financial Times 28 
September 2000. 
Kalashnikova, N. - S. Sukhova (2000), 'Vsia vlast' Sovetam bezopasnosti!' Segodnya, 26 May 
2000, 1. 
Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii, (1993). 
Kozyreva, A. (2000a), 'V poiskakh kompromissa'. Rossiiskaia gazeta, 1 July 2000, 1-2. 
Kozyreva, A. (2000b ), 'L'vinaia dolia popravok'. Rossiiskaia gazeta, 12 July 2000, 1-2. 
Lysenko, V.N. (2000a), 'Federatsiia v Rossii v nachale XXI veka: Perspektivy razvitiia', 
unpublished paper. 
96 
PUTIN'S FEDERAL REFORMS 
Lysenko, V. (2000b ), 'Federatsiia v nachale XXI veka'. Nezavisimaia gazeta, 11 April 2000, 8. 
Miroshnichenko, A. (2000), 'Kazantsev Creates 'District Government' in Southern Federal 
District'. East West Institute Russian Regional Report, 7 September 2000, 5, 32. 
Opredelenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii po zaprosu Verkhovnogo Suda 
Kabardino-Balkarskoi Respubliki o proverke konstitutsionnosti punkta 'e' stat'i 81 
Konstitutsii Kabardino-Balkarskoi Respubliki, stat'i 2 i punkta 3 stat'i 17 Zakona 
Kabardino-Balkarskoi Respubliki 'O mestnom samoupravlenii v Kabardino-Balkarskoi 
Respublike, 2 November 2000, Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No. 2 
(2001), 20. 
Osoboe mnenie sud'i Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii V.O. Luchina, 'Delo o 
proverke konstitutsionnosti polozhenii Ukaza Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii 'O merakh 
po ukrepleniiu edinoi sistemy ispolnitel'noi vlasti v Rossiiskoi Federatsii', 30 April 1996, 
Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1 3 (1996), p. 24. 
Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 'Delo o proverke konstitutsionnosti 
polozhenii Ukaza Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii 'O merakh po ukrepleniiu edinoi sistemy 
ispolnitel'noi vlasti v Rossiiskoi Federatsii', 30 April 1996, Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1 3 ( 1996 ), 15. 
Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii po delu o proverke konstitutsion-
nosti Zakona Udmurtskoi Respubliki ot 17 aprelia 1996 goda 'O sisteme organov gosu-
darstvennoi vlasti v Udmurtskoi Respublike;24 January 1997, Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo 
Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1 1 ( 1997), 2. 
Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii po delu o proverke konstitutsion-
nosti statei 80, 92, 93 i 94 Konstitutsii Respubliki Komi i stat'i 31 Zakona Respubliki Komi 
ot 31 oktiabria 1994 goda 'Ob organakh ispolnitel'noi vlasti v Respublike Komi,' Rossiiskaia 
gazeta. (31January1998), 4. 
Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii po delu o proverke konstitutsion-
nosti otdel'nykh polozhenii Konstitutsii Respubliki Altai i Federal'nogo zakona 'Ob 
obshchikh printsipakh organizatsii zakonodatel'nykh (predstavitel'nykh) i ispolnitel'nykh 
organov gosudarstvennoi vlasti sub"ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii,' 7 June 2000, Rossiiskaia 
gazeta, (21 June 2000), 5. 
Postnova, V. (2000), 'V nov' obretennaia gosudarstvennost'. Nezavisimaia gazeta, 28 June 2000, 
4. 
Putin, V.V. (2000), 'Vlast' dolzhna byt' rabotaiushchei!' Rossiiskaia gazeta, 19 May 2000, 3. 
Rabinovich, I. (2000), 'Bashkortostan Ignores Court Ruling'. EastWest Institute Russian 
Regional Report, 4 October 2000, 5, 36. 
Rudden, B. (1994), 'Civil Law, Civil Society, and the Russian Constitution'. Law Quarterly 
Review 1994, llO, 56-83. 
Rutland, P. (2000 ), 'Putin's Path to Power'. Post-Soviet Affairs, 2000 16( 4), 313-345. 
Sadchikov, A. (1999), 'Suvereniteta stanet men' she'. Izvestia, 30 July 1999, 2. 
Shariet, R. (2001), 'Putin and the Politics of Law in Russia'. Post-Soviet Affairs, 2001 17(3), 
195-234. 
Shinkin, A. (2000), 'Altai perebral suvereniteta'. Rossiiskaia gazeta, 10 June 2000, 3. 
Stroev, E. (2000), 'Ne Navredi: Razmyshleniia o reforme gosudarstvennogo ustroistva Rossii'. 
Nezavisimaia gazeta, 6 June 6 2000, l, 8. 
Sukhova, S. (2000a), 'Gossovetskaia vlast'. Segodnia, 24 May 2000, I. 
97 
BEYOND THE GARDEN RING 
Sukhova, S. (2000b), 'Zakon samosokhraneniia'. Segodnia, I8 July 2000, l. 
'The Bridling of Russia's Regions'. The Economist, I I November 2000, 61. 
Tropkina, 0. (2000a), 'Soglasitel'naia komissiia k soglasiiu ne prishla'. Nezavisimaia gazeta 
I5 July 2000, 1. ' 
Tropkina, 0. (2000b ), 'Sovet Federatsii ne speshit obrashchat'sia v KS'. Nczavisimaia gazeta 
20 October 2000, 3. ' 
Tsebelis, G. - J. Money (1997), Bicameralism. Cambridge. 
Ukaz No 1400, 2I September 2I, 1993, 'O poetapnoi konstitutsionnoi reforme v Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii,' Sobranie Aktov Prezidenta i Pravitel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1 39, September 
27, I993, item 3597, p. 3912. 
Ukaz No 696, July 9, I 997, 'O polnomochnom predstavitele Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
v regione Rossiiskoi Federatsii,' Sobranie zakonodatcl'stva Rossiiskoi Fedcratsii, No 28, 14 
July 1997, item 3421, p. 5549. 
Ukaz No 790, May 5, 2000, 'O postanovlenii Pravitel'stva Respubliki Ingushetiia ot 3 avgusta 
1998 g., No 204 'O merakh po ispolneniiu Ukaza No 72 ot 28 Fevralia 1997 g. Prezidenta 
Respubliki Ingushetiia, Postanovleniia Soveta Bezopastnosti Respubliki Ingushetiia No 4 
ot 27 maia 1998 g.', Sobranie zakonodatcl'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No 19, 8 May 2000, 
item 2060, p. 4208. 
Ukaz No 791, May 5, 2000, 'Ob Ukaze Prezidenta Respubliki Ingushetiia ot 16 sentiabria 
1997 g. No 229 'O merakh po uluchsheniiu sbora platezhei za potreblennye gaz i 
elektroenergiiu', Sobranie zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No 19, 8 May 2000, item 
2061, p. 4209. 
Ukaz No 800, May 5, 2000, 'O postanovlenii glavy administratsii Amurskoi oblasti ot 23 
iunia 1999 g., N.365 'Ob organizatsii propuska grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federatsii v torgovyi 
kompleks g. Kheikhe (KNR)', Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, N.19, 8 May 
2000, item 2064, p. 4210. 
Ukaz N.849, May 13, 2000, 'O polnomochnom predstavitele Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
v federal'nom okruge',Sobranie zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, N.20, 15 May 2000, 
item 2112, p. 4318. 
Ukaz N.851, May 15, 2000, 'O postanovlenii glavy administratsii Smolenskoi oblasti ot 26 
iiunia 1998 g. N.271 'O vzimanii platezhei za zagriaznenie okruzhaiushchei prirodnoi 
sredy ot inostrannykh iuridicheskikh lits i grazhdan, ekspluatiriushchikh avtotransport-
nyie sredstva na avtodorogakh Smolenskoi oblasti', N.800, 5 May 2000, 'O postanovlenii 
glavy administratsii Amurskoi oblasti ot 23 iunia 1999 g., N.365 'Ob organizatsii propuska 
grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federatsii v torgovyi kompleks g. Kheikhe (KNR)', Sobranie 
Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, N.19, 8 May 2000, item 2064, p. 4210., N.21, 22 May 
2000, item 2164, p. 4387. 
Ukaz N.1055, June 7, 2000, 'Ob ukazakh Prezidenta Respubliki Adygeia ot 8 oktiabria 1997 
g. N.246 'O nomenklature kadrov Prezidenta Republiki Adygeia i Kabineta Ministrov 
Respubliki Adygeia' i ot 4 iiunia 1999 g. N.111 'O vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v Ukaz 
Prezidenta Respubliki Adygeia ot 8 oktiabria 1997 g. N.246 'O nomenklature kadrov 
Prezidenta Respubliki Adygeia i Kabineta Ministrov Respubliki Adygeia,' Sobranie 
Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, N.24, 12 June 2000, item 2544, p. 4971. 
98 
PUTIN'S FEDERAL REFORMS 
Ukaz N.110 l, June 12, 2000, 'O priostanovlenii deistviia postanovleniia gubernatora Tverskoi 
oblasti ot 28 sentiabria 1999 g. N.856 'O tarifakh na elektricheskuiu energiiu dlia naseleniia 
oblasti', Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, N.25, 19 June 2000, item 2676, p. 
5122. 
Ukaz N.1101, June 12, 2000, 'O priostanovlenii deistviia postanovleniia gubematora Tverskoi 
oblasti ot 28 sentiabria 1999 g. N .856 'O tarifakh na elektricheskuiu energiiu dlia naseleniia 
oblasti', Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, N.25, 19 June 2000, item 2676, p. 
5122. 
Ukaz N.1500, August 12, 2000, 'O priostanovlenii deistviia postanovleniia gubernatora Tul'skoi 
oblasti ot 12 Aprelia 2000 g. N.137 'Ob uporiadochenii litsenzirovaniia deiatel'nosti po 
zagotovke, pererabotke i realizatsii loma tsvetnykh i chernykh metallov', Sobranie 
Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, N.34, 21August2000, item 3436, p. 6913. 
Ukaz N.1602, September 1, 2000, 'O Gosudarstvennom sovete Rossiiskoi Federatsii; Sobranie 
Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, N.36, 4 September 2000, item 3633, p. 7186. 
Ukaz N.1605, September 1, 2000, 'O priostanovlenii deistviia Ukaza Prezidenta Respubliki 
Ingushetia ot 26 aprelia 1999 g. N. I 02 'O nekotorykh merakh po regulirovaniiu protsessa 
migratsii v Respublike Ingushetia', Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, N.36, 4 
September 2000, item 3635, p. 7190. 
Ukaz N.1620, September 9, 2000, 'O priostanovlenii deistviia Ukaza Prezidenta Respubliki 
Adygeia ot 30 maia 1994 g. N.83 'Omerakh po ogranicheniiu migratsii v Respubliku 
Adygeia; Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, N.38, 18 September 2000, item 
3777, p. 7682. 
Ukaz N.97, January 30, 2001, 'O vnesenii dopolneniia i izmeneniia v Polozheniie o polnomoch-
nom predstavitele Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii v federal'nom okruge, utverzhdennoe 
Ukazom Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 13 maia 2000 g., N.849;Sobranie Zakono-
datel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, N.6 (5 February 2001), item 551, p. 1624. 
Ukaz N.132, February 7, 200 l, 'O priostanovlenii deistviia Ukaza Prezidenta Respubliki Ingu-
shetiia ot 22 Aprelia 2000 g. N.76 'Ob uprazdnenii Gosudarstvennogo komiteta Respubliki 
Ingushetiia po sviazi' i postanovleniia Pravitel'stva Respubliki Ingushetiia ot 20 maia 2000 
g. N.192 'Ob uchrezhdenii gosudarstvennogo unitarnogo predpriatiia 'Upravlenie 
elektricheskoi sviazi Respubliki lngushetia', Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 
N.7, 12 February 2001, item 627, p. 1812. 
Wines, M. (2000), 'Putin's Move on Governors Would Bolster his Role'. New York Times, 22 
May 2000, A3. 
White, S. - Rose, R. -I. McAllister (1997), How Russia Votes. Chatham, New Jersey. 
Zakon 'O obshchikh printsipakh organizatsii mestnogo samoupravleniia v Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii; Sobranie zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, N.35 (1995), item 3506; with 
amendments found at N.12 (1997), item ~378. 
Zakon 'O poriadke formirovaniia Soveta Federatsii Federal'nogo Sobraniia Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii; Sobranie zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, N.50, December 11, 1995, item 
4869, p. 8967. 
Zakon 'O printsipakh i poriadke razgranicheniia predmetov vedeniia i polnomochii mezhdu 
organami gosudarstvennoi vlasti Rossiiskoi Federatsii i organami gosudarstvennoi vlasti 
sub'ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii; Sobranie zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii N.26, June 
28, 1999, item 3176, pp. 5685-5692. 
99 
BEYOND THE GARDEN RING 
Zakon 'Ob obshchikh printsipakh organizatsii zakonodatel'nykh (predstavitel'nykh) i 
ispolnitel'nykh organov gosudarstvennoi vlasti sub'ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii; Sobranie 
zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Fedcratsii. N.42, October 18, 1999, item 5005, p. 9417. 
Zakon 'O vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v Federal'nyi zakon 'Ob obshchikh printsipakh 
organizatsii mestnogo samoupravleniia v Rossiiskoi Federatsii', Sobranie zakonodatel'stva 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii, N.32, August 7, 2000, item 3330, p. 6243. 
Zakon 'O vnesenii dopolneniia v Federal'nyi zakon 'Ob obshchikh printsipakh organizatsii 
zakonodatel'nykh (predstavitel'nykh) i ispolnitel'nykh organov gosudarstvennoi vlasti 
sub'ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii', Sobranie zakonodate/'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, N.7, 
February 12, 2001, item 608, p. 1784. 
Zhdanova, D. (2001), 'Gubernatorov snova prizyvaiut delit'sia s tsentrom'. Nezavisimaia 
gazeta, 20 September 2001, 2. 
100 
PUTIN 1 S FEDERAL REFORMS 
References 
1 Goble (2000). Mukhametshin was speaking at a conference in Ufa, Bashkortostan, as 
reported by the RFE/RL Tatar-Bashkir Service. 
2 In an unpublished paper written in February 2000 for working groups in the Duma and 
FC, Vladimir N. Lysenko, Deputy Chairman of the Duma Committee on Federal and 
Regional Policy, wrote: 'In the 1990s, there took shape in Russia a super-presidential regime 
with a mono-subjective power, a weakly federal state (with elements of both unitarism 
and confederalism), a quasi-multi-party structure, burdened by a nomenklatura-clan type 
of management, a corrupted ruling class and, to all intents and purposes, the absence of 
local self-government.' Lysenko (2000a). 
3 Zakon N.26, 28 June 1999. See also Sadchikov (1999), 2. 
4 A more sympathetic analysis of the law would argue that, by definition, ratification of 
these documents was unnecessary. Agreements (soglasheniia) are defined by the law to be 
'the legal form of transfer by federal organs of executive power and organs of executive 
power of subjects of the Russian Federation between one another for the realisation of 
part of their authority' (Art. 2, § 7). To the extent that treaties ( dogovory) are made between 
organs of state power (Art. 2, § 6), their subject matter is merely the 'concretisation, ... 
conditions and manner of transfer, ... [and] forms of co-operation and collaboration .. : (Art. 
17) of jurisdiction and authority already established in the federal Constitution, which 
itself establishes no ratification requirement for such arrangements. However such an 
reading leaves unsolved the federal problems the law ostensibly was designed to ameliorate. 
5 Buried in the teict of a law passed in October 1999 is a clause asserting the authority of 
the subject of the Russian Federation with regard to treaties. Article 5, § 2, part '3' of the 
federal law 'On general principles of organisation of the legislative (representative) and 
executive organs of state power of the subjects of the Russian Federation' states that 'By law 
of the subject of the Russian Federation the conclusion and cancellation of treaties of the 
subject of the Russian Federation are confirmed.' However, what is meant by 'confirm' is 
far from clear and, although Article 5 deals with the authority of the legislative branch, it is 
unclear what role for that branch is implied by the phrase 'by law:' the authority to confirm 
itself, or the authority to make a law regarding confirmation? In any event, this unheralded 
clause seems to have had even less impact on the bilateral treaty process than Yeltsin's law 
of late June. See Zakon N.184-FZ, 18 October 1999. 
'Treaties (dogovory) - general statements of principle and jurisdiction - generally were 
not subject to time limits or mandatory renegotiation at set intervals. Agreements 
(soglasheniia) - detailed, concrete arrangements for specific problems - generally expired 
a~er five years. Of potential interest, however, is the very recent signing of soglasheniia 
With (by some accounts nine) regions in the Far East Federal District. Chernyshev (2001), 
~ ~?ble (2001). Under the watchful eye of Presidential Envoy Konstantin Pulikovskii, Justice 
1~ 1sterYuri Chaika signed agreements outlining steps to be taken in the process of bringing 
regional constitutions and laws into conformity with federal law. However, these soglasheniia 
~ould appear to be different in kind from the bilateral agreements made in the Yeltsin era. 
hereas savvy regional negotiators of Yeltsin-era agreements focused primarily on 
extr · 
actmg as much regional control over natural resources, industry, and other economic 
101 
BEYOND THE GARDEN RING 
issues from the federal centre as possible, these new agreements seem in part a federal 
response to frustration over inadequate tax collection and the perennial goal of conforming 
regional laws to federal standards. They are, in other words, about establishing greater 
federal control, quite the opposite of earlier regional objectives. Also of interest, are reports 
that the only region in the Far Eastern District not to sign an agreement was the only 
republic in the District, Sakha-Yakutia. 
7 Russian Public TV, Moscow 17 May 2000. Reported by BBC Monitoring. Reprinted in 
Rossiiskaya gazeta, 19 May 2000, 3. 
8 'Open Letter to Russian Voters,' 25 February 2000. Campaign website: http://putin2000.ru/ 
07/05.html. Emphasis in the original. 
9 Contrary to the assertion by Peter Rutland that this phrase was a 'throw-away remark 
that Putin made while talking to journalists,' Putin has repeatedly expressed (on national 
television) his well-known maxim of government. In a televised address to the nation on 
the eve of his reform package, Putin linked the phrase to his 'strengthening of the vertical 
of executive power, saying: 'This is what the dictatorship of law means. It would mean we 
are living in one strong country, one single state called Russia.' Russian Public TV, Moscow, 
in Russian 1700 gmt 17 May 2000, reported by BBC Monitoring. For the text of this speech, 
see also Putin (2000), 3. In another televised speech on 8 July 2000 before both houses of 
the Federal Assembly, Putin managed to give a fundamental concept of civil law - the 
importance of maintaining a space outside the domain of public law - an ominous tinge: 
'That is why we insist on just one dictatorship - the dictatorship of the law, although I 
know that many people dislike the expression. That is why it is so important to indicate the 
boundaries of the domain where the state is full and only master, to state precisely where it 
is final arbiter and to define those spheres where it should not meddle.' One is left to wonder 
what size such a non-state sphere could have in Putin's Russia. Rutland (2000), 345; Russia 
Public TV, Moscow, in Russian 1800 gmt, 8 July 2000; Russian Public TV, Moscow in Russian 
1700 gmt 17 May 2000. 
10 At least two distinguished scholars have noted that Putin purposefully seemed to contrast 
his dictatorship oflaw with the Bolshevik slogan 'dictatorship of the proletariat.' See Rutland 
(2000), 345; Sharlet (2001), 204. As Professor Sharlet observes, 'These casual, metaphoric 
usages seem to have evoked little or no noticeable reaction in a country where the word 
'dictatorship' has long held a privileged place in official discourse to mean the highest and 
ultimate authority, as well as its unrestricted dominion over polity and society: However, 
that is precisely the reason human rights observers both within and outside Russia were so 
concerned: a society too used to dictatorship and too unfamiliar with law, like its president, 
risked erring on the side of too much law. As Bernard Rudden noted, for example, 'there is 
a precious sphere of non-law' in the development of private civil law and, by extension, 
civil society: Rudden ( 1994), 60. 
11 Ukaz N. 849, 13 May 2000. See also Rossiiskaia gazeta, 16 May 2000, 5. 
12 The decree annulled Yeltsin's decree of 9 July 1997, which established the post of 
presidential plenipotentiary for each of the eighty-nine subjects of the Federation. Ukaz 
N. 696, 9 July 1997. 
13 Two exceptions to this norm were that, 1. polpredy were given extensive control over 
federal cadre policy in the districts, and 2. polpredy were given general rights of access and 
participation not only in federal organs operating in the district, but also organs of state 
102 
PUTIN'S FEDERAL REFORMS 
power of the regions themselves and their organs of local self-government. Even these 
assertions of authority, however, could be interpreted in both power-generating and power-
deflating ways. 
14 According to Michael Wines, 'Mr. Putin is said to have sprung the plan on top governors 
last week in a meeting that ran so long that the president's next appointment - his new 
prime minister, Mikhail Kasyanov - cooled his heels for more than an hour.' Wines (2000), 
A3. See also 'Russia's Putin discusses government structure with Premier Kasyanov; ITAR-
TASS news agency, Moscow, in English 1526 gmt 17 May 2000, BBC Monitoring. 
15 Putin (2000), 3. The speech was given on Russian television on 17 May. 
16 The day after the decree, television station NTV aired the positive remarks of Samara 
Governor Konstantin Titov, Voronezh region head Ivan Shabanov, Saratov Governor Dmitri 
Ayatskov, and others. NTV International, Moscow in Russian 1200 gmt 14 May 2000, 
reported by BBC Monitoring. Among those few analysts and politicians who made early 
criticisms of the reforms are Radio Free Europe Editor Paul Goble and Chuvash President 
Nikolai Fedorov, who became the unofficial opposition spokesman to Putin's reforms. 
17 Liz Fuller has suggested that this is precisely what initially led Tatarstan's Mintimer 
Shaimiev to endorse the reform. Fuller (2000). 
18 Rossiiskaia gazeta, 19 May 2000, 3. 
19 Segodnia, 16 May 2000, 4. 
20 General G.S. Poltavchenko, Lt. Gen. V.V. Cherkesov, Gen. V.G. Kazantsev, Col. Gen. P.M. 
Latyshev, Lt. Gen. K.B. Pulikovskii. S.V. Kirienko and L.V. Drachevskii hold no military 
rank. See The Economist, 11 November 2000, 61; Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 
(2000), 52(20), 2-4; Rossiiskaia gazeta, 20 May 2000, 3; Segodnia, 31May2000, 1-2. 
21 For Kirienko, see http://www.pfo.ru/, the official website. For Latyshev, see http:// 
www.uralfo.ru/ ,_the official website. For Drachevskii, see http://www.sfo.nsk.su/, the official 
website. 
22 See East West Institute Russian Regional Report, 26 July 2000, 5, 29. Two months following 
his appointment, Konstantin Pulikovskii was still living in a hotel in Khabarovsk. In 
Ekaterinburg, Petr Latyshev found himself the victim of dirty tricks: accepting an offer by 
ob last' authorities to set up offices in an old Pioneers' Palace, Latyshev found himself the 
centre of scandal, accused of displacing the children who had previously been granted its 
use. Natalya Mints, 'Latyshev Steps Up Activities in Urals Federal District,' See EastWest 
Institute Russian Regional Report, 27 September 2000, 5, 35. 
23 Corwin (2001). 
24 Quoted in Rutland (2000), 348. 
25 Nezavisimaia gazeta, 27 October 2000, translated by BBC Monitoring. The decree met 
With only moderate success, as some regions reorganized media holdings to circumvent 
federal control. 
26 Miroshnichenko (2000). 
27FC Head Calls for Law on Presidential Representatives. RFE/RL Russian Federation Report, 
1 November 2000, 2, 40. 
28 Samoilov was not left to wait out in the cold for long. By September 2001, he had been 
appointed secretary of a federal presidential commission for the demarcation of authority 
between the centre and the regions. Putin Clarifies Powers of Presidential Representatives. 
EastWest Institute Russian Regional Report, 10 January 2001, 6, I; Ukaz N. 97, 30 January 
2001. 
103 
BEYOND THE GARDEN RrNG 
29 'Above everything else, the state is the law. It stands for constitutional law and order and 
discipline. If these tools are weak, the state is also weak or simply nonexistent .... It is 
outrageous that - think about this figure- one-fifth of the legal regulations adopted by the 
regions contradict the country's fundamental law, [ ... ]' Russian Public TV, Moscow, in 
Russian 1700 gmt 17 May 2000, reported by BBC Monitoring. The text of the speech was 
also reprinted in Putin (2000), 3. 
10 Ukaz N. 790, 5 May 2000; Ukaz N. 791, 5 May 2000. Two more Ingush decrees were later 
suspended by President Putin. See Ukaz N. 132, 7 February 2001. 
31 Ukaz N. 800, 5 May 2000. 
32 'Russia's Putin suspends decrees by Ingush president, Amur Region governor; ITAR-
TASS news agency, Moscow, in English 1212 gmt 11 May2000, reported by BBC Monitoring. 
33 Ukaz N. 851, 15 May 2000. See also Rossiiskaia gazeta, 18 May 2000, 4. 
34 Ukaz N. 1055, 7 June 2000. The Adygeia decrees enumerated state posts to be filled by 
the nomination of the President of Adygeia; Ukaz N. 1101, 12 June 2000. This decree 
established tariffs on electric energy for the population of the oblast'; Ukaz N. 1500, 12 
August 2000. This decree regulated licensing of the procurement, stock-piling and use of 
scrap ferrous & non-ferrous metals in the oblast'. Ukaz N. 1605, 1 September 2000. This 
degree concerned migration and residency policies in the republic. Ukaz N. 1620, 9 
September 2000. This decree concerned republican procedures for the acquisition of rights 
of residence in the republic. 
35 Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Art. 90. Upon promulgation of a federal law previously 
subject to a presidential decree, the latter loses force to the former. 
36 Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Art. 85, § 2: 'The president of the Russian Federation 
shall have the right to suspend the acts of organs of executive power of subjects of the 
Russian Federation in the case of conflict of these acts with the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation, federal laws, international responsibilities of the Russian Federation or viola-
tions of rights and freedoms of the person and citizen, pending resolution of this question 
by the appropriate court.' 
37 Danilenko - Burnham (1999), 156. 
38 Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii, no. 3 (1996), 15. 
39 Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii, no. 3 ( 1996), p. 24. 
40 Opredelenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii po zaprosu gruppy deputatov 
Gosudarstvennoi Dumy o proverke sootvetstviia Konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
otdel'nykh polozhenii konstitutsii Respubliki Adygeia, Respubliki Bashkortostan, Respubliki 
Ingushetiia, Respubliki Komi, Respubliki Severnaia Osetiia-Alaniia i Respubliki Tatarstan, 
27 June 2000. Opinions and decisions of the Court have slightly different values as precedent. 
With regard to the subjects discussed above, however, there seems to be little practical 
difference. 
41 See e.g., the Court's ruling, in the context of the 1992 Tatarstan referendum, that select 
provisions of the republic's constitution and declaration of sovereignty were unconstitu-
tional they repudiated the supremacy of federal law. The ruling is translated into English 
in 'Decree of the Constitutional Court of the RSFSR, 13 March 1992,' Statutes & Decisions: 
The Laws of the USSR and its Successor States. ( 1994), 30, 3, 32-48. See also rulings against 
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81 Oliver Wendell Holmes' famous comment is apropos: 'I do not think the United States 
would come to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think 
the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the 
several States.' Quoted in Gunther - Sullivan ( 1997), 65. 
82 While impeachment has sometimes been used to remove executive officials from office 
this function has been rare in the United States. Impeachment has predominantly bee~ 
used to unseat judges. In either case, this is done by and at the behest of the legislature (not 
the executive) sitting as a court of impeachment (not, in principle, as a political body) to 
decide a violation of the law of its own jurisdiction (state or federal). 
83 Even when, in 1957, Arkansas Governor Orval E. Faubus openly defied court-ordered 
school desegregation with the use of Arkansas national guardsmen, his flagrantly 
unconstitutional act was not met by then President Eisenhower with efforts to seek his 
dismissal. Nor could this have been attempted by the federal Chief Executive against a 
state governor with an electoral mandate. Eisenhower responded by calling out U.S. soldiers, 
whose forceful presence was used to accomplish the federal courts' orders. 
84 Article 29, § 4 of the revised law, N. 184-FZ of 6 October 1999 (explicated in Art. 1, § 6 of 
Putin's reform legislation, N.106-FZ of 29 July 2000. 
85 The fear may well be justified. One week after the law entered into effect (a six month 
delay was built into the law signed 29 July 2000), Putin seemed to have won a prize that 
eluded his predecessor for years - the resignation of Primorskii Krai governor Evgenii 
Nazdratenko. Though it is unclear whether Putin specifically threatened the governor with 
use of this law, its sudden presence in Putin's arsenal of powers certainly was known to all 
parties. Filipov (2001), A9. According to Radio Free Europe, the day before Nazdratenko's 
resignation (for health reasons many disputed), Putin phoned Nazdratenko, and the head 
of the Kremlin's State Control Department, Yevgenii Lisov, personally visited Nazdratenko. 
Goble- Corwin (2001). 
86 Why wasn't a conciliation commission established to whittle away the harshest features 
of this reform, as had been accomplished with the reform of the FC itself? One factor may 
have been the different vote tallies in the Duma between the two pieces of legislation. 
Article 105, § 5 of the Russian Constitution grants the Duma the power to adopt a federal 
law over a FC veto by a vote of two-thirds the total number of the lower chamber's 450 
deputies (i.e. 300 deputies). Whereas the third reading of the bill on the composition of 
the FC passed in the Duma with only 308 votes, and approval of its compromise version 
passed with only 307 votes, the Duma passed the bill on dismissal of regional executives 
and legislatures by a solid 361 votes, well over the margin necessary to defeat a veto by the 
upper chamber. 
87That law was N.154-FZ, 28 August 1995, 'O obshchikh printsipakh organizatsii mestnogo 
samoupravleniia v Rossiiskoi Federatsii; Sobranie zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, N.35 
(1995), item 3506; with amendments found at N.12 (1997), item 1378. 
88 This reform was made law by N .107-FZ, 4 August 2000, 'O vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii 
v Federal'nyi zakon 'Ob obshchikh printsipakh organizatsii mestnogo samoupravleniia v 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii', Sobranie zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, N. 32, 7 August 2000, 
item 3330, p. 6243. 
89 The treatment of heads of municipal administrative organs is exceptional. Regional 
executives and the RF President both have power to issue an ukaz of dismissal and to appoint 
temporary acting heads of those organs in the interim before elections, unless the charter 
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of the municipal prescribed a different procedure. Proposals for dismissal of such officials 
by the President of the Russian Federation may be introduced by the legislature of the 
region, the regional executive, the RF Government and the RF Procurator-General. 
90 Berger (1999), 4-5. 
91 See, in particular, N.48, 49 and especially 51. 
92 The Federalist, N.51. 
''This was the infamous Ukaz N.1400, 21September1993. 
94 Addressing the nation on May 17, Putin expounded: 'If the head of a territory can be 
dismissed by the country's president under certain circumstances, he should have a similar 
right in regard to authorities subordinate to him. Today, this is not just a right thing to do, 
but simply necessary in order to restore the functional vertical structure of executive power 
in the country. For a long time now the federal parliament, the government and even the 
president have not been able to achieve even simple but absolutely necessary things because 
they lacked such tools: to observe the citizens' rights and implement Russian state legislation 
with equal precision throughout Russia, in its most remote parts as well as in Moscow. 
This is what the dictatorship of law means. It would mean we are living in one strong 
country, one single state called Russia.' 
"This model was expounded as early as February 2000 in an unpublished paper prepared 
for Duma and FC working groups. The author is grateful to Mikhail Stolyarov for a copy 
of this document. The model was eventually published in early April. Lysenko (2000b ), 8. 
96 Lysenko (2000b ), 8. Lysenko argued that the strong president and centralized state he 
prescribed for Russia was of a 'European type,' resembling the personal power of Charles 
de Gaulle, not some 'central Asian despotic regime.' 
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